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Abstract 
What are the chances of an ethical individual rising through the ranks of a 
political party or a corporation in the presence of unethical peers? To answer 
this question, I consider a four-player two-stage elimination tournament, in 
which players are partitioned into those willing to be involved in sabotage 
behavior and those who are not. I show that, under certain conditions, the 
latter are more likely to win the tournament.   
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1. Introduction 
It has been acknowledged that office politics is present in almost every 
workplace and that it usually decreases the efficiency of promotion 
tournaments among peers dramatically (Carpenter et al., 2010). Nevertheless, 
it is evident that some individuals avoid such behavior, which is sometimes 
viewed as unethical, even when it is unobservable and beneficial to them 
(Charness et al., 2014).1 Such choices are perhaps related to their intrinsic 
values. For obvious reasons and for a given level of ability, it is socially 
desirable that this type of individual is able to get ahead in an organization. 
But is that usually the outcome? What are the chances of an ethical politician 
becoming the leader of her party or of an ethical employee moving up the 
corporate ladder? In contrast to the conventional wisdom, in what follows I 
will present a theoretical model which shows that their chances are not 
necessarily less than their unethical competitors.   
I consider a two-stage elimination tournament with four risk-neutral 
contestants, in which two hawks (unethical individuals) and two doves 
(ethical individuals) compete in pairwise matches. In the first stage of the 
tournament, each hawk competes against a dove. In the second stage, the 
winners compete against each other for a single prize allocated to the single 
                                                          
1
 In the experiment conducted by Charness et al. (2014), only around 50% of the 
participants who had the option of sabotaging others chose to do so, even though it 
was the equilibrium strategy. 
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winner.2 In a given match, a hawk chooses productive effort and sabotage (or 
distractive) effort deducted from the productive effort of her rival, while a 
dove chooses only productive effort. In particular, in a given match, 
productive effort increases the player’s own chances of winning, while 
sabotage decreases those of her rival. I therefore (partially) adopt the 
terminology of Lazear (1989) who defines the contestant who is less efficient 
at sabotage as a dove and the one who is more efficient as a hawk. More 
specifically, he defines as a "saint" the contestant whose sabotage effort is 
sufficiently costly that, under certain conditions, she may choose not to 
sabotage her rival in equilibrium or may even help her by choosing a negative 
level of sabotage effort. Note, however, that unlike in Lazear (1989), I assume 
that the dove’s choice not to sabotage is non-strategic and is attributed to 
intrinsic ethical or moral values. Specifically, the dove’s choice not to sabotage 
is assumed to be exogenously, rather than endogenously, determined.3  
In the elimination tournament, either all matches are modeled as a contest 
with a probit contest success function (CSF) (usually defined in the literature 
as a tournament), which is the canonical model for studying incentive 
                                                          
2
 The concept of an elimination tournament was used in the seminal paper of Rosen 
(1986) to describe a similar game with n stages without sabotage. It is also used to 
describe multi-stage contests, in which all players compete against each other, but 
only the winners survive to the next stage (see, for instance, Altmann et al., 2012 and  
Fu and Lu, 2012). 
3 Note that in a rent-seeking contest, neither type of effort is socially desirable (see 
Congleton et al., 2008). However, sabotage effort may still be viewed as less ethical 
than standard rent-seeking effort.    
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schemes in promotion tournaments (see Chen, 2003, and Münster, 2007), or as 
a Tullock contest (Tullock, 1980), which is widely used to model lobbying 
contests (see Konrad 2000; Amegashie, 2012). The main difference between 
these two types of contests is the way in which noise and effort interact to 
determine the players' performance.4  
I show that if the cost function is quasi-linear in productive effort (an 
assumption that has been considered in the literature; see, for instance, 
Konrad 2009; pp. 115-118), then in an interior subgame perfect equilibrium 
(SPE), the probability that a dove wins the prize is greater than half, or if there 
is only one dove and three hawks, the dove has a higher chance of winning 
the tournament than a hawk. The main intuition behind these results is that a 
dove who reaches the finals will be participating in a less intensive 
competition and therefore will have a larger expected net payoff. Winning in 
the first stage is therefore more worthwhile for a dove and therefore 
motivates her to invest greater effort. Although the model is quite simple and 
therefore cannot fully explain any specific real-world situation, the result is 
                                                          
4 In particular, effort in the Tullock contest is multiplied by noise in order to 
determine performance, while in the tournament-type of contest, noise is added to 
effort to determine performance. For a review of the literature on sabotage, see 
Chowdhury and Gürtler (2015) and for a review of contests see Fu and Wu (2019). 
Note that although Amegashie and Runkel (2007) consider a two-stage elimination 
tournament with sabotage, they use the “all-pay auction” CSF and prior to the 
tournament allow all contestants to sabotage potential rivals who participate in the 
parallel contest. They build on Groh et al. (2012) who study optimal seedings in a 
similar game without sabotaging. For the Tullock elimination tournament without 
sabotage, see Stracke (2013) and Cohen et al. (2018).  
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nonetheless grounds for optimism since unobservable ethical behavior can be 
rewarded. Furthermore, the result may help in understanding why ethical 
behavior has not become extinct (even though I do not use standard 
evolutionary methodology in what follows).      
Furthermore, in the case that each match in the elimination tournament is 
modeled as a Tullock contest, I show that a sufficiently large prize insures the 
existence of a unique interior SPE in pure strategies. In the case where each 
match is modeled as a tournament, I discuss existence but do not provide a 
formal proof. Nevertheless, I demonstrate the main results with two 
examples—one for each type—in which a unique interior SPE exists in pure 
strategies.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
presents the main result for contestants' probabilities of winning in an interior 
SPE. Section 4 discusses existence and section 5 provides examples for the 
main result. Section 6 concludes.  
2. The model 
Four players compete in a two-stage elimination tournament. In particular, in 
the first stage of the tournament, each player iϵ{1,2,3,4} participates in one 
contest against a rival jϵ{1,2,3,4}, j≠i. In the second stage, the two winners 
compete against each other for a prize v, which is allocated to the winner. 
There are two types of players: a Hawk (H) and a Dove (D). In each stage 
kϵ{1,2}, each player i of type D only invests in "productive" effort xi
k≥0 with a 
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unit cost5, where player i of type H also invests in sabotage effort si
k≥0 with 
the convex cost function c(sik), where c(0)=0, c'(0)=0, c'>0 and c''>0. For any 
two players i and j, i≠j competing in a contest held in stage kϵ{1,2}, the 
effective effort of player i is bik≡max[0,xik-sjk], while sjk≡0 if player j is a dove. 
There are two players of type D and two of type H. In the first stage of the 
tournament, each player of type D competes against a player of type H.  
In a contest held in stage kϵ{1,2} between players i and j, the probability 
of winning for player i is pik≡p(bik,bjk) for i≠j. I note that pik is twice 
differentiable, increasing in bik and decreasing in bjk in the interior of its 
domain. Later on, I specify pik  in more detail.  
In the reminder of the paper, I focus on pure strategies.  
3. Main Results 
In this section, I characterize an interior SPE, in which xik>0 for all i and sik>0 
for all i of type H for all k, and show that, in such an equilibrium, the 
probability that a dove wins the tournament is greater than half. I further note 
that the result extends to a tournament with one dove and three hawks in the 
sense that the dove’s probability of winning the elimination tournament is 
larger than that of a given hawk. The existence of such an equilibrium is 
discussed in the following section, after I have provided examples to 
demonstrate the results. 
As is usually the practice, I solve the problem by applying backward 
induction. Note that the contest held in stage 2 is independent of the effort 
                                                          
5 Namely, the marginal cost of xik is 1. 
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invested in stage 1, and therefore a player i of type H who won the first 
contest solves: 
(1) max
           𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠𝑖
2
𝑝𝑖
2𝑣 − 𝑐(𝑠𝑖
2) − 𝑥𝑖
2, 
where a player i of type D solves: 
(2) max
𝑥𝑖
2
𝑝𝑖
2𝑣 − 𝑥𝑖
2. 
Therefore, the first order conditions (F.O.Cs) for an interior solution in the 
contest held in stage 2 are as follows: 
 If both contestants are type D then: 
(3) 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2
𝜕𝑏𝑖
2 𝑣 = 1  
for each contestant i. 
In the case that both contestants are type H, an interior solution must 
also satisfy, for each contestant i≠j and in addition to (3), the condition: 
(4) −
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2
𝜕𝑏𝑗
2 𝑣 = 𝑐′(𝑠𝑖
2). 
If type H competes against type D, then an interior solution satisfies three 
conditions: (3) for the type D player, and (3) and (4) for the type H player.  
 Note that 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑘
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘 = −
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑘
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘 since 𝑝
𝑘(𝑏𝑖
𝑘, 𝑏𝑗
𝑘) = 1 − 𝑝𝑘(𝑏𝑗
𝑘, 𝑏𝑖
𝑘). Therefore, in a 
contest held in stage 2 between player i and j, condition (3) of player i and 
condition (4) of player j imply that in an interior solution where at least one of 
the players is of type H:  
(5) 𝑠2 = 𝑐′−1(1).   
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Note that (5) implies that, in an interior solution, s2 is independent of v.6 This 
in turn implies that an interior solution in which s2>0 may not exist when v is 
small, since in that case the expected net payoff of a hawk in stage 2 can be 
negative when s2 satisfies (5). This is further discussed in the next section. 
 The following lemma determines the contestants' productive effort in 
an interior symmetric solution in a contest held in stage 2: 
Lemma 1 Assume that the contest held in stage 2 between player i and player j has 
an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which bi2=bj2, and let 
the contestant's effort in a contest held between two doves be b*>0. Then, b*+c'-1(1) is 
the productive effort in a contest held between two hawks, and (b*,b*+ c'-1(1)) is the 
productive effort pair for a hawk and a dove, respectively, in a contest between them.  
All proofs appear in the appendix. It follows that in a contest held in stage 2, 
the expected net payoff of contestant i (not including the sunk cost invested in 
stage 1) in an interior symmetric solution is: 
(6) 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2∗ =
{
  
 
  
 
𝑣
2
− 𝑏∗,                                                          if both players are type 𝐷
𝑣
2
− (𝑏∗ + 𝑐′−1(1) + 𝑐(𝑐′−1(1)))         if both players are type 𝐻
𝑣
2
− (𝑏∗ + +𝑐′−1(1)),                            if only player  𝑖 is of type D
𝑣
2
− (𝑏∗ + 𝑐(𝑐′−1(1))),                          if only player  𝑖 is of type H
 }
  
 
  
 
. 
Therefore, assuming that the contest held in stage 2 has a unique 
interior symmetric solution in which b2=b*, then in a contest held in stage 1 
player i of type H solves: 
 (7) max
 𝑥𝑖
1,𝑠𝑖
1
𝑝𝑖
1(
𝑣
2
− (𝑏∗ + 𝑐(𝑐′−1(1)) + 𝑝𝐻
1 𝑐′−1(1))) − 𝑐(𝑠𝑖
1) − 𝑥𝑖
1, 
                                                          
6
 This has already been noted by Konrad (2009, pp.115-118). 
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where 𝑝𝐻
1  is the probability that the hawk wins in the parallel contest held in 
stage 1.  
Player j of type D solves: 
(8) max
             𝑥𝑗
1
𝑝𝑗
1(
𝑣
2
− (𝑏∗ + 𝑝𝐻
1 𝑐′−1(1))) − 𝑥𝑗
1. 
Note that for players i and j, 𝑝𝐻
1  is taken as given.  
Let 𝐴 =
𝑣
2
− (𝑏∗ + 𝑐(𝑐′−1(1)) + 𝑝𝐻
1 𝑐′−1(1)) and 𝐵 =
𝑣
2
− (𝑏∗ + 𝑝𝐻
1 𝑐′−1(1)). 
The F.O.Cs for an interior solution in the contest held in stage 1 between 
player i of type H and player j of type D are: 
(9) 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1
𝜕𝑏𝑖
1 𝐴 = 1, 
(10) −
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1
𝜕𝑏𝑗
1 𝐴 = 𝑐′(𝑠𝑖
1) 
and  
(11) 
𝜕𝑝𝑗
1
𝜕𝑏𝑗
1𝐵 = 1. 
 To obtain the main result, I assume in the remainder of the analysis 
that in all contests held in the elimination tournament, pik takes one of the 
following two commonly used CSFs: 
a. The Tullock CSF which is formally defined as: 
(12) 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 = {
(𝑏𝑖
𝑘)𝑟
(𝑏𝑖
𝑘)𝑟+(𝑏𝑗
𝑘)𝑟
, 𝑖𝑓  ∑ 𝑏𝑡
𝑘 > 0𝑡∈{𝑖,𝑗}
1
2
                               otherwise
}, 
 where r≤1.  
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This CSF that has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) is considered to be 
one of the canonical models for analyzing lobbying, sport tournaments, 
conflicts, etc. (see Corchón and Serena, 2018). 
b. The probit CSF (Dixit, 1987) which is usually defined as the 
"tournament form”. 
More precisely, let player i's performance in stage k be: yik=f(bik)+εik  for all 
iϵ{1,2,3,4} and kϵ{1,2}, where f is increasing and concave and εik is a random 
variable distributed symmetrically around zero. In a contest held in stage k 
between two players i and j, player i wins if yik>yjk. Let G be the cumulative 
distribution function of the variable εik-εjk (εik and εjk are i.i.d). Then: 
(13) 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 = 𝐺(𝑓(𝑏𝑖
𝑘) − 𝑓(𝑏𝑗
𝑘)). 
This CSF is widely used to study incentive schemes, and in particular it was 
used in Lazear (1989), a seminal paper that studied the optimal structure of 
prizes in promotion tournaments, in which workers also invest effort in 
sabotage. 
It is well known that the main difference between (12) and (13) is that 
in (12), noise is multiplied by effort to determine player's performance (i.e., 
yik=bikεik, where εik has the inverse exponential distribution; see Jia, 2008) while 
in (13), as shown above, noise is added to effort in order to determine 
performance. In both (12) and (13), the player with the highest performance 
wins.  
I can now state the main result: 
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Proposition 1 Consider an elimination tournament in which pik is defined by (12) or 
(13) for all k. In an interior SPE in pure strategies, in which sikϵ(0,xjk) when i is a 
hawk and xik>0 for all i for all k, the probability that a dove wins v is greater than 
half. 
The main intuition behind this result is that a contestant in a one-shot contest 
with a common value prize has a probability of winning of half regardless of 
her type. However, for a given rival, a contestant of type D invests less effort 
than a contestant of type H and therefore her expected net payoff is larger. 
Given that the contest held in stage 2 is equivalent to a one-shot contest with a 
common value prize, this implies that a dove has a stronger incentive to win 
the first match than a hawk, and therefore her effective effort is larger. Note 
that this also implies that if in the elimination tournament there are three 
hawks and one dove (rather than two hawks and two doves), then among all 
contestants the dove has the highest probability of winning the tournament.       
4. Existence  
In this section, I derive sufficient conditions for there to exist a unique interior 
SPE in pure strategies in the elimination tournament. In particular, 
Proposition 2 shows that there exists a unique interior SPE in pure strategies 
when the CSF takes the Tullock form and v is sufficiently large. I also discuss 
existence for the case in which the CSF is defined by (13).  
Proposition 2 If v is sufficiently large, and the CSF is defined by (12) in all contests 
held in the elimination tournament, then there exists a unique interior SPE in pure 
strategies in the elimination tournament, in which sikϵ(0,xjk) if i is a hawk, and xik>0 
for all i for all kϵ{1,2}.  
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The main idea of the proof is that, in any given match and given her rival's 
equilibrium effort, a hawk's choice set is a compact space and therefore has a 
global maximum, and when v is sufficiently large that maximum is interior. In 
the next section, I demonstrate this result with an example, in which v is 
"reasonably large". Furthermore, the proof of Proposition 2 builds on well-
known results for existence of a unique interior equilibrium in pure strategies 
in the standard (namely, without sabotage) one-shot two-player Tullock 
contest with either symmetric players (see Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992) 
or asymmetric players (see Nti, 1999). However, in the tournament-type 
contest (i.e., with the CSF in (13)), the existence of a unique interior Nash 
equilibrium in the standard one-shot contest is less obvious. In particular, it 
has been acknowledged that there must be sufficient dispersion of noise to 
achieve such an equilibrium (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz, 1983; Krishna and Morgan, 1998; Chen, 2003; Drugov and Ryvkin, 
2018). Specific conditions depend on the structure of f and the cost function 
and usually apply to symmetric contests (which does not include the contest 
held in stage 1). Although important, I abstract from this analysis here. 
Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate the result in Proposition 1, I will 
present an example below with a CSF defined by (13), in which there exists a 
unique interior SPE in pure strategies. More generally, if there exists an 
interior equilibrium in the standard one-shot symmetric and asymmetric 
contests in which the CSF is defined by (13), then a large prize should be 
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sufficient to insure the existence of such an equilibrium in the presence of 
sabotage. 
5. Examples 
The following examples demonstrate the results: example 1 for the 
Tullock contest and example 2 for the tournament form. In both, the solution 
admits the unique interior SPE in pure strategies. 
Example 1 Define pik by (12) and let r=1. In addition, assume that 𝑐(𝑠𝑖
𝑘) =
(𝑠𝑖
𝑘)
3
12
 
and v=80. Then, by conditions (3) and (4), s2=2 and b*=20 and therefore:  
(14) 𝐴 = 19
1
3
− 2𝑝𝐻
1  
and 
 (15) 𝐵 = 20 − 2𝑝𝐻
1 . 
Let player i be of type H and player j be of type D. Substituting (14) and (15) 
into (A.3) yields: 
(16) 
𝑏𝑖
1
𝑏𝑗
1 =
19
1
3
−2𝑝𝐻
1
20−2𝑝𝐻
1 =
19
1
3
−2
𝑑𝑖
1
𝑑𝑗
1+𝑑𝑖
1
20−2
𝑑𝑖
1
𝑑𝑗
1+𝑑𝑖
1
, 
which implies that, 𝑏𝑗
1 ≈ 1.147𝑏𝑖
1and therefore: 
(17) 𝑝𝑖
1 ≡ 𝑝𝐻
1 ≈ 0.466. 
Substituting (17) into (14) and (15) results in 𝐴 ≈ 18.4 and 𝐵 ≈ 19. It therefore 
follows from (A.4) that 𝑠1 = √4
𝐴
𝐵
≈1.97. 
Substituting (17) and (15) into (11) yields 𝑏𝑖
1 ≈ 4.13 and 𝑏𝑗
1 ≈ 4.73. Therefore:  
(18) 𝑝𝑖
1𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑠1) − 𝑏𝑖
1 ≈ 3.8 > 0 
(> 𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑏𝑗
1 + 𝑠1) − 𝜀 ≈ −6.8) 
14 
 
and  
(19) 𝑝𝑗
1𝐵 − (𝑏𝑗
1 + 𝑠1) ≈ 3.46. 
Therefore, according to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the probability that a 
dove wins the tournament in the unique interior SPE in pure strategies is 
2*(1/2)*(1-0.466)=0.534.7  
Example 2 Define pik by (13) such that εik and εjk are uniformly distributed over 
the interval [-5,5]8 and f(b)=√b. In addition, assume that 𝑐(𝑠𝑖
𝑘) =
(𝑠𝑖
𝑘)
3
27
 and v=20. 
Therefore, by (4), s2=3. Furthermore, by condition (3), 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2
𝜕𝑏𝑖
2 𝑣 = 𝑔𝑓
′𝑣 =
1
10
1
2√𝑏𝑖
2
20 = 1, which implies that b*=1. Therefore:  
(20) 𝐴 = 8 − 3𝑝𝐻
1  
and 
 (21) 𝐵 = 9 − 3𝑝𝐻
1 . 
Let player i be of type H and player j be of type D. Substituting (20) and (21) 
into (9) and (11) yields: 
(22) 𝑔𝑓′(𝑏𝑖
1)(8 − 3𝑝𝐻
1 ) =
1
10
1
2√𝑏𝑖
1
(
 8 − 3
√𝑏𝑖
1 − √𝑏𝑗
1 + 5
10
)
 = 1 
and 
                                                          
7 Note that it can be verified that at the solution, 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
2)2
 
< 0 and 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
1
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
1)2
 
< 0, which is 
sufficient to conclude that it establish the SPE in pure strategies (see the appendix, 
footnotes 12, 13 and 14).  
8 The specification of a unified distribution is commonly used in experimental 
studies for this type of model (see, for instance, Altmann et al., 2012). 
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(23) 𝑔𝑓′(𝑏𝑗
1)(9 − 3𝑝𝐻
1 ) =
1
10
1
2√𝑏𝑗
1
(9 − 3
√𝑏𝑖
1−√𝑏𝑗
1+5
10
) = 1. 
The solution of (22) and (23) is √𝑏𝑗
1 = 0.37575 and √𝑏𝑖
1 = 0.32575. Therefore: 
(24) 𝑝𝑖
1 ≡ 𝑝𝐻
1 =
0.32575−0.37575+5
10
= 0.495. 
Substituting (24) into (20) and (21) yields 𝐴 = 6.515 and 𝐵 = 7.515. 
Substituting into (A.4) yields: 
(25) 𝑠1 = √9
𝐴
𝐵
≈ 2.79, 
(26) 𝑝𝑖
1𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑠1) − 𝑏𝑖
1 ≈ 2.3 
and 
(27) 𝑝𝑗
1𝐵 − (𝑏𝑗
1 + 𝑠1) ≈ 0.86. 
Note that in this example the second-order conditions for an interior 
maximum for each player and in any contest are satisfied and it can easily be 
verified that a contestant i does not benefit from deviating to a corner solution 
at which xik=5 in order to insure that she wins. The first-order necessary 
conditions for an interior maximum therefore describe the SPE in pure 
strategies.9 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, I demonstrate that an ethical individual can become the leader 
of a political party or the CEO of a corporation. In particular, I show that, 
under some conditions, the players in a four-player elimination tournament 
                                                          
9
  Note that in this example and for all k: 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
𝑘
𝜕(𝑥𝑖
𝑘)2
< 0 for all i, and 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
𝑘
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝜕𝑠𝑖
𝑘 = 0 and 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
𝑘
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
𝑘)2
< 0 at the solution of the F.O.Cs for all i of type H.  
16 
 
who choose not to be involved in sabotage are more likely to win. Although 
this result is rather surprising and appears to contradict the conventional 
wisdom, the intuition is quite straightforward and involves standard 
monetary incentives. Therefore, there is reason to believe that the conclusions 
carry over to the real world in some circumstances. In other words, it seems 
that nice guys don’t always finish last.     
 Appendix:  
Proof for Lemma 1: Since 𝑝𝑖
𝑘(𝑏𝑘, 𝑏𝑘) ≡ 𝑝𝑗
𝑘(𝑏𝑘, 𝑏𝑘) ≡ 𝑝(𝑏𝑘, 𝑏𝑘), then 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑘(𝑏𝑘,𝑏𝑘)
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘 ≡
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑘(𝑏𝑘,𝑏𝑘)
𝜕𝑏𝑗
𝑘 . Therefore, by condition (3) of players i and j, in an interior 
symmetric solution of a contest held in period 2, 𝑏𝑖
2 = 𝑏𝑗
2 = 𝑏∗. This implies 
that, when players i and j of type D compete: 
 (A. 1) 𝑥𝑖
2 = 𝑥𝑗
2 ≡ 𝑏∗.  
When players i and j of type H compete: 
(A. 2) 𝑥𝑖
2 = 𝑥𝑗
2 = 𝑏∗ + 𝑐′−1(1). 
If a player of type H competes against a player of type D, then type D invests 
𝑏∗ + 𝑐′−1(1) and the productive effort of type H is 𝑏∗. QED 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, note that if pi2 is defined by (12) or by (13), then 
the interior solution of a contest held in stage 2 must be symmetric. 
Specifically, substituting (12) or (13) into (3) implies that bi2=bj2 in a contest 
held in stage 2 between players i and j. Therefore, the interior solution of a 
contest held in stage 2 is defined by Lemma 1.  
Furthermore, (9) and (11) imply that in an interior SPE, 
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(A. 3)
𝜕𝑝𝑗
1
𝜕𝑏𝑗
1
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1
𝜕𝑏𝑖
1
=
𝐴
𝐵
. 
Specifically, if 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 is defined by (12), then 
𝜕𝑝𝑗
1
𝜕𝑏𝑗
1
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1
𝜕𝑏𝑖
1
= (
𝑏𝑖
1
𝑏𝑗
1)
𝑟, and if 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 is defined by 
(13), then 
𝜕𝑝𝑗
1
𝜕𝑏𝑗
1
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1
𝜕𝑏𝑖
1
=
𝑓′(𝑏𝑗
1)𝑔(𝑓(𝑏𝑖
1)−𝑓(𝑏𝑗
1))
𝑓′(𝑏𝑖
1)𝑔(𝑓(𝑏𝑖
1)−𝑓(𝑏𝑗
1))
=
𝑓′(𝑏𝑗
1)
𝑓′(𝑏𝑖
1)
. Recall that f' is decreasing and 
therefore either way, 
𝜕𝑝𝑗
1
𝜕𝑏𝑗
1
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1
𝜕𝑏𝑖
1
< 1 ↔ 𝑏𝑖
1 < 𝑏𝑗
1. Note that 𝐴 < 𝐵 and therefore the 
RHS of (A.3) is smaller than 1. It follows that if (A.3) is satisfied, then 𝑏𝑖
1 < 𝑏𝑗
1 
which implies that 𝑝𝑖
1 > 𝑝𝑗
1.  
Therefore, given that there are two players of type D in the 
tournament, the probability that this type of player wins v is 2(1/2pi1)= 
pi1>1/2, where pi1 is the probability that player i of type D wins a contest held 
in stage 1.  QED 
Proof for Proposition 2: Define pik by (12). As usual, I apply a backward 
induction. In particular, I first present an auxiliary lemma that derives a 
sufficient condition under which there exists a unique interior Nash 
equilibrium in a contest held in stage 2. Then I proceed to prove the main 
result.  
Lemma 2 If v is sufficiently large, then there exists a unique interior Nash 
equilibrium in a contest held in stage 2.   
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Proof of Lemma 2: It is well known that the unique solution that solves (3) for 
both players i and j is bi=bj=rv/4 (see Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; 
Proposition 3). Moreover, in an interior solution, s2 is uniquely defined by (5). 
Therefore, if the contest held in stage 2 has an interior solution, then it is 
uniquely defined by Lemma 1 such that b*=rv/4. In particular, if the contest is 
held between two doves, then it is well known that b*=rv/4 is the unique 
equilibrium effort (see Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Proposition 3). For 
other cases, it is required to show that Lemma 1 gives the players' best 
response. This is shown below.  
Note that Eπi2≤0 at xi2=v and therefore without loss of generality I can 
assume that xi1≤v for all i. Let xj2=rv/4+c'-1(1). The choice set of player i of type 
H is xi2xs2=[0,v]x[0,rv/4+c'-1(1)], which is a compact set and therefore has a 
global maximum.10 Note that this maximum is interior.  
To see this, note that 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
𝑥𝑖
2=𝑣
< 0, and assume first that player j is of 
type D. Then, 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
𝑥𝑖
2=0
≤ 0 for all 𝑠2 < 𝑥𝑗
2, and 
𝜕𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕𝑠2
|
𝑠2=0
=
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2
𝜕𝑏𝑗
2 𝑣 > 0 for all 
𝑥𝑖
2 > 0. Furthermore, if s2=xj2, then player i insures her win with an arbitrarily 
small xi2=ε, which implies that max𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
(𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠2)=(𝜀,𝑥𝑗
2) 
= 𝑣 − 𝑐 (
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1)) − 𝜀, 
                                                          
10 Note that since, by definition, bjk≡max[0,xjk-sik], the interval si2>xj2 is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, note that when player j is of type D, 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
𝑥𝑗
2>0
 is continues in (xi2,s2) 
except at (xi2,s2)=(0,xj2), and when player j is of type H, 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
𝑥𝑗
2>0, 𝑆𝑗
2>0 
 is continues in 
(xi2,si2) except at (xi2,si2)=(sj2,xj2). However, these two discontinuities are removable 
since a global maximum is not near them when v is sufficiently large. This is shown 
below.    
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while 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
(𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠2)=(
𝑟𝑣
4
,𝑐′−1(1)) 
=
𝑣(2−𝑟)
4
− 𝑐(𝑐′−1(1)). Therefore, since c is 
increasing and convex, 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
(𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠2)=(
𝑟𝑣
4
,𝑐′−1(1)) 
> max [(max𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
(𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠2)=(𝜀,𝑥𝑗
2) 
),0] 
for sufficiently large v. Thus, the global maximum of Eπi2 is interior. Since at 
xj2=rv/4+c'-1(1), (𝑥𝑖
2, 𝑠2) = (
𝑟𝑣
4
, 𝑐′−1(1)) is the unique solution to (3) and (4), at 
which 𝜕
2𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
2)2
< 0, it describes player i's best response to xj2=rv/4+c'-1(1).11 Note 
that since −
𝜕2𝑝𝑗
2
𝜕(𝑏𝑗
2)2
|
(𝑥𝑖
1,𝑠1,𝑥𝑗
1)=(
𝑟𝑣
4
,𝑐′−1(1),𝑥),𝑥>𝑐′−1(1) 
< 0, (3) describes player j's best 
response to (𝑥𝑖
2, 𝑠2) = (
𝑟𝑣
4
, 𝑐′−1(1))  when 𝐸𝜋𝑗
2|
𝑥𝑗
2=
𝑟𝑣
4
+𝑐′−1(1)
=
𝑣(2−𝑟)
4
− 𝑐′−1(1) >
0, which is the case when v is sufficiently large.  
                                                          
11 Specifically, there is another solution to (3) and (4) at which 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
2)2
> 0 (namely, at 
this solution the second-order condition for an interior maximum is violated). To see 
this, note that at xj2=rv/4+c'-1(1), (3) and (4) imply that 𝑥𝑖
2(𝑠2) = 𝑐′(𝑠2)(
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1) −
𝑠2). Substituting 𝑥𝑖
2(𝑠2) in (4) and rearranging terms results in 𝑐′−1(1) +
𝑟𝑣
4
= 𝑠2 +
𝑟𝑣
((𝑐′(𝑠2))
1+𝑟
2 +(𝑐′(𝑠2))
1−𝑟
2 )
2, where the RHS is U-shaped in s2 over the interval 𝑠
2  ∈
[0, 𝑐′−1(1) +
𝑟𝑣
4
]. In particular, since 𝑠2 +
𝑟𝑣
((𝑐′(𝑠2))
1+𝑟
2 +(𝑐′(𝑠2))
1−𝑟
2 )
2|
𝑠2=𝑐′−1(1)+
𝑟𝑣
4
>
𝑐′−1(1) +
𝑟𝑣
4
, and 𝑠2 +
𝑟𝑣
((𝑐′(𝑠2))
1+𝑟
2 +(𝑐′(𝑠2))
1−𝑟
2 )
2 → ∞ as s2→0, there are two roots on the 
interval 𝑠2  ∈ (0, 𝑐′−1(1) +
𝑟𝑣
4
) that solve this equality, one of which is 𝑐′−1(1). Note 
that  
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕(𝑠2)2
|
(𝑥𝑖
2(𝑠2),𝑠2,𝑥𝑗
2)=(𝑥𝑖
2(𝑐′−1(1)),𝑐′−1(1),
𝑟𝑣
4
+𝑐′−1(1)) 
=
1
4𝑟𝑣
− 𝑐′′(𝑐′−1(1)) is negative for 
sufficiently large v, and therefore, 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
2)2
|
(𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠2,𝑥𝑗
2)=(𝑥𝑖
2(𝑠2),𝑠2 ,
𝑟𝑣
4
+𝑐′−1(1)) 
must be positive 
at the other root.  
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Instead, assume now that player j is of type H and sj2=c'-1(1), where 
v>c'-1(1). Note that 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2 ≤ 0 when xi2≤c'-1(1) and si2<xj2, and 
𝜕𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕𝑠𝑖
2 |
 𝑠𝑖
2=0 
=
−
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2
𝜕𝑏𝑗
2 𝑣 > 0 for all 𝑥𝑖
2 > 𝑠𝑗
2. Furthermore, if si2=xj2, then player i insures her win 
with xi2=sj2+ε, which implies that max𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
𝑠𝑖
2=𝑥𝑗
2 
= 𝑣 − 𝑐 (
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1)) −
(𝑐′−1(1) + 𝜀), while 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
(𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠𝑖
2)=(
𝑟𝑣
4
+𝑐′−1(1),𝑐′−1(1)) 
=
𝑣(2−𝑟)
4
− 𝑐′−1(1) −
𝑐(𝑐′−1(1)). Therefore, since c is increasing and convex, for v sufficiently 
large, 𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
(𝑥𝑖
2,𝑠𝑖
2)=(
𝑟𝑣
4
+𝑐′−1(1),𝑐′−1(1)) 
> max [max𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
𝑠2=𝑥𝑗
2 
, 0] for sufficiently 
large v. This implies that  the global maximum of Eπi2 is interior and therefore, 
(𝑥𝑖
2, 𝑠𝑖
2) = (
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1), 𝑐′−1(1)) describes player i's best response to itself (i.e., 
to: (𝑥𝑗
2, 𝑠𝑗
2) = (
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1), 𝑐′−1(1))).12 QED 
I now proceed to stage 1. Assume that v is sufficiently large such that 
Lemma 2 holds.  Then a contest held in stage 1 is equivalent to a one-shot 
contest between player i of type H and player j of type D, in which A is 
contestant's i's evaluation of the prize and B is contestant's j's evaluation fo the 
prize. In what follows, I assume that this is the case.  
                                                          
12
  Note that (𝑥𝑖
2, 𝑠𝑖
2) = (
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1), 𝑐′−1(1)) is the only solution of (3) and (4) at 
which 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
2)2
< 0. In particular, at 𝑥𝑗
2 =
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1),  (3) and (4) imply that 𝑥𝑖
2(𝑠𝑖
2) =
𝑐′(𝑠𝑖
2) (
𝑟𝑣
4
+ 𝑐′−1(1) − 𝑠𝑖
2) + 𝑠𝑗
2 and 𝑐′−1(1) +
𝑟𝑣
4
= 𝑠𝑖
2 +
𝑟𝑣
((𝑐′(𝑠𝑖
2))
1+𝑟
2 +(𝑐′(𝑠𝑖
2))
1−𝑟
2 )
2, which 
implies that 𝑠𝑖
2 (and also 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕(𝑠𝑖
2)2
|
(𝑥𝑖
2(𝑠𝑖
2),𝑠𝑖
2,𝑥𝑗
2) 
) is determined independently of 𝑠𝑗
2 and 
therefore the analysis proceeds as in footnote 11.  
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Note that by (10) and (11) in an interior solution of this contest: 
(A. 4) 𝑠1 = 𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
). 
Furthermore, by Nti (1999, Proposition 3), the unique solution of (9) 
and (11) is (𝑏𝑖
1, 𝑏𝑗
1) = (
𝑟𝐴𝑟+1𝐵𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
,
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
). Therefore, if an interior solution 
exists, then it is unique (namely, there can only be one interior solution).  
Assume that 𝑥𝑗
1 =
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
). Then, the choice set of player i is 
xi1xs1=[0,A]x[0,xj1], which is a convex set and therefore has a global 
maximum.13 Note that 𝐸𝜋𝑖
1|
𝑥𝑖
1=𝐴
< 0, 𝐸𝜋𝑖
1|
𝑥𝑖
1=0
≤ 0 for all 𝑠1 < 𝑥𝑗
1 and 
𝜕𝐸𝜋𝑖
1
𝜕𝑠1
|
𝑠1=0
= −
𝜕𝑝𝑖
1
𝜕𝑏𝑗
1 𝐴 > 0 for all 𝑥𝑖
1 > 0. Furthermore, if s1=xj1, then player i 
guarantees her win with an arbitrarily small xi1=ε, which implies that 
max𝐸𝜋𝑖
1|
𝑠1=𝑥𝑗
1 
= 𝐴 − 𝑐 (
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
)) − 𝜀, while 
𝐸𝜋𝑖
2|
(𝑥𝑖
1,𝑠1)=(
𝑟𝐴𝑟+1𝐵𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
,𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)) 
=
𝐴𝑟+1
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
(𝐴𝑟 + 𝐵𝑟 − 𝑟𝐵𝑟) − 𝑐(𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)). Note that 
when v→∞, t→
𝑣(2−𝑟)
4
 tϵ{A,B} and therefore, since c is increasing and convex, 
for v sufficiently large, 𝐸𝜋𝑖
1|
(𝑥𝑖
1,𝑠1)=(
𝑟𝐴𝑟+1𝐵𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
,𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)) 
> max [max𝐸𝜋𝑖
1|
𝑠1=𝑥𝑗
1 
, 0] for 
sufficiently large v, which implies that the global maximum of Eπi1 is interior 
and therefore (𝑥𝑖
1, 𝑠1) = (
𝑟𝐴𝑟+1𝐵𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
, 𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)) describes player i's best response to 
                                                          
13    The comment in footnote 10 regarding a contest held in stage 2, in which player i 
is of type D, applies here as well. 
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𝑥𝑗
1 =
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
).14 Furthermore, since −
𝜕2𝑝𝑗
2
𝜕(𝑏𝑗
2)2
|
(𝑥𝑖
1,𝑠1)=(
𝑟𝐴𝑟+1𝐵𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
, 𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)) 
< 0 
for all 𝑥𝑗
1 > 0, (11) describes player j's best response when 
𝐸𝜋𝑗
1|
(𝑥𝑗
1,𝑥𝑖
1,𝑠1)=(
𝑟𝐴𝑟𝐵𝑟+1
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
),
𝑟𝐴𝑟+1𝐵𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
,𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)) 
=
𝐵𝑟+1
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
(𝐴𝑟 + 𝐵𝑟 − 𝑟𝐴𝑟) −
𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
) > 0, which is the case when v is sufficiently large (since then t→
𝑣(2−𝑅)
4
, 
tϵ{A,B}).15 QED 
 
                                                          
14
 Note that at 𝑥𝑗
1 =
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
), (9) and (10) imply that 
𝑥𝑖
1(𝑠1) = 𝑐′(𝑠1) (
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
) − 𝑠1). Substituting 𝑥𝑖
1(𝑠1) into (10) and 
rearranging terms yields 
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
) = 𝑠1 +
𝑟𝐴
((𝑐′(𝑠1))
1+𝑟
2 +(𝑐′(𝑠1))
1−𝑟
2 )
2 , in which 
the RHS is U-shaped in s1 over the interval 𝑠1 ∈ [0,
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
)]. In particular, 
since 𝑠1 +
𝑟𝐴
((𝑐′(𝑠1))
1+𝑟
2 +(𝑐′(𝑠1))
1−𝑟
2 )
2 |
𝑠1=
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)
>
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
) and 𝑠1 +
𝑟𝐴
((𝑐′(𝑠1))
1+𝑟
2 +(𝑐′(𝑠1))
1−𝑟
2 )
2 → ∞ as s1→0, there are two roots on the interval 𝑠
1  ∈
(0,
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+ 𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
) ) that solve this equality, where 𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
) is one of them. Note 
that when v→∞  
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
1
𝜕(𝑠1)2
|
(𝑥𝑖
1(𝑠1),𝑠1,𝑥𝑗
1)=(𝑥𝑖
1(𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)),𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
),
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)) 
=
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)((1+𝑟)𝐴𝑟+(1−𝑟)𝐵𝑟)
𝑟𝐴2𝑟−1𝐵2
−
𝑐′′ (𝑐′−1 (
𝐴
𝐵
)) →
1
4𝑟𝑣
− 𝑐′′(𝑐′−1(1)), which  is negative for sufficiently large v, and 
therefore, 
𝜕2𝐸𝜋𝑖
1
𝜕(𝑠1)2
|
(𝑥𝑖
1,𝑠1,𝑥𝑗
1)=(𝑥𝑖
1(𝑠1),𝑠1,
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
+𝑐′−1(
𝐴
𝐵
)) 
must be positive at the other root.   
15 Note that with further specification of pik and c(sk), xi1 and xj1 can be obtained for 
instance by dividing (11) by (9) to calculate, 𝑝𝐻
1 , and then substituting 𝑝𝐻
1  into A and B 
to obtain: (𝑏𝑖
1, 𝑏𝑗
1) = (
𝑟𝐴𝑟+1𝐵𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
,
𝑟𝐵𝑟+1𝐴𝑟
(𝐴𝑟+𝐵𝑟)2
). This is demonstrated in Example 1. 
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